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Democratic Values Among Chinese
People
Analysis of a public opinion survey
Lu Chunlong
1 Since 1978, China has experienced economic marketisation and a degree of political
liberalisation 1, and the importance of Maoist ideology has diminished in people’s daily
life. Recent studies on political culture, while not comprehensive, have suggested the
emergence of democratic values 2, and thus, present a picture of hope for the prospect
of  Chinese democracy.  The existing literature pays little  attention to the origins of
these democratic values, although studies have suggested that education, urban/rural
residence and Party/non-Party membership are factors that have an impact on such an
outcome 3.
2 This study is based on the scientifically sampled national survey of public opinion in
China, the World Values Survey (WVS) 2001 4. WVS 2001 China Survey in June 2001 has
been  implemented  by  the  Research  Center  for  Contemporary  China  at  Peking
University. The sample consists of 1,000 respondents distributed in proportion to both
urban and rural populations to be representative of the whole adult population (18
years  old  and over).  The  main  objective  of  this  study is  to  examine the  origins  of
democratic values in China and provide evidence to show the types of people likely to
support these values. 
Why are democratic values important?
3 When explaining the conditions that give rise to American democracy, Tocqueville has
emphasised the importance of egalitarian mores in American society 5. Contemporary
democracy theorists have reached a consensus that a set of pro-democratic values held
at the individual level is conducive to the installation and consolidation of democracy.
Democracy theorists identify certain distinctive clusters of democratic attitudes that
are widely held across individuals. These clusters of democratic attitudes are durable
and form subjective world orientations that are highly resistant to change, and are
seen as the driving force for democratic development 6. 
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4 Almond and Verba were the first to systematically consider the concept of civic culture
as a means to identify civic cultural  attributes which are conducive to durable and
stable democracy 7. They assert that the civic culture is a mixed political culture. The
participant role has been added to the subject and parochial roles. Gibson uses seven
sub-dimensions—support  for  norms  of  democracy,  political  tolerance,  valuation  of
liberty,  support  for  competitive elections,  rights  consciousness,  support  for  dissent,
and support for independent media— to measure democratic beliefs of the public and
establish  the  linkages  between  these  democratic  beliefs  and  democracy  8.  Putnam
operationalises  civicness  by  following  indicators:  vibrancy  of  associational  life,
newspaper readership, electoral turnout, and lack of preference voting 9. Putnam pays
attention  to  the  roles  of  voluntary  associational  life.  The  horizontally  organised
associations build norms of generalised reciprocity and interpersonal trust, which are
favourable to durable and effective democracy. These seminal works lay out the basic
framework for positivist analysis of democratic values. 
5 Chinese  traditional  political  culture  is  often  regarded as  an  obstacle  to  democratic
transition 10. Confucian culture “emphasised the group over the individual, authority
over liberty, and responsibilities over rights” and “lacked a tradition of rights against
the state”. In Confucian society, “harmony and cooperation were preferred over
disagreement and competition,” “the maintenance of order and respect for hierarchy
were central values” 11. Therefore, China’s traditional political culture is attributed as
being “non-democratic”. 
6 Studies  nevertheless  have  suggested  the  emergence  of  democratic  values  in  China.
These  studies  based their  conclusions  on the  results  of  public  opinion surveys  and
suggest  that  Chinese  political  culture  is  in  transition.  For  example,  Ogden suggests
“China has inklings of  a  democratic  political  culture in certain respects  and not in
others” 12.
Measuring the support of democratic values 
7 Nathan and Shi were the first  to attempt a study of the democratic orientations of
Chinese  people.  They  measure  the  support  of  democratic  values  from  three  sub-
dimensions:  the  perceived  impact  of  government,  political  efficacy  and  political
tolerance 13.  Wang and his  associates adopt the same measurement criteria 14.  Shi’s
more recent works are also influenced by this method with an emphasis on political
efficacy 15. Nonetheless, this approach is not directly aimed at capturing the democratic
values  themselves.  With  an  emphasis  on  the  political  efficacy,  this  measurement
realises the importance of participant political  culture in democracy,  but is  neither
complete nor accurate in capturing democratic orientations. 
8 Chen and Zhong’s  measurement  of  democratic  values  is  more direct,  and accurate,
following  three  sub-dimensions:  support  for  competitive  elections  of  government
officials,  support  for  equal  protection and rights  for  all  people,  and support  for  an
independent media 16.  This measurement touches important aspects of a democratic
culture. However, the support of norms of democracy, which is critical for measuring
democratic values, has been left behind 17. 
9 Dowd and his associates use an open question: “which of the following values is most
important?”, and put political democracy and individual freedom together with public
order, fair administration of justice, social equality, and national peace and prosperity
18 to measure the support of norms of democracy directly. Even though a step on from
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Chen and  Zhong,  this  measurement  is  questionable.  It  fails  to  make  distinctions
between affective support of democracy and evaluative support of democracy. 
10 Drawing upon the seminal works by Almond and Verba, Gibson, and Putnam, this study
will  measure  the  democratic  values  of  Chinese  people  from  following  two  sub-
dimensions: the acceptance of democratic norms (affective support) and the judgement
about the performance of democracy (evaluative support).
11 Why this  distinction?  Some recent  studies  suggest  that  the  support  for  democratic
principles is very different from evaluations of how democracy will perform in practice
19.  Our  method  allows  respondents  to  “express  doubts  about  democracy,  without
directly rejecting democratic principles”, and to focus “on broad features of democratic
governance, and not on short-term judgments about specific governments” 20. In this
study, the affective support of democracy is measured by the survey question regarding
“having a democratic political system”, while the evaluative support of democracy is
measured by the survey question stating that “democracy may have problems but it’s
better  than any  other  form of  government”.  The  main  concern  of  this  study  is  to
provide  evidence  about  what  sorts  of  people  are  likely  to  hold  values  considered
democratic. 
Three theories of the origins of democratic values
12 1) This theory emphasises the importance of socio-economic factors such as income,
education  and  age.  According  to  this  theory,  the  more  wealthy,  well-educated  and
young the people are, the more they are likely to support democracy. With the
continued economic development of China, there should be more signs of attraction to
democracy or values considered democratic as a result. 
Nathan  and  Shi  have  found  that  the  perceived  impact  of  government  varies
substantially  with  the  level  of  education.  They  suggest  that  the  level  of  political
tolerance is likely to increase as older less-educated people are replaced by younger,
better educated people. Even though less-educated people have a relatively low sense
of  the government’s  impact,  relatively  low internal  efficacy,  relatively  low political
tolerance,  and  relatively  high  confidence  in  the  government,  Nathan  and  Shi  are
optimistic  about  the  prospect  for  Chinese  democracy.  They  conclude  that  Chinese
political culture will move closer to the patterns characteristic of democratic countries
as the economy grows 21.
In a more recent study, Shi also finds that higher levels of education and income play a
significant  role  in  making  people  transcend  their  traditional  culture.  People  with
higher  education  and  income  not  only  tend  to  perceive  their  relationship  with
authority as reciprocal but are also more willing to enter into conflict with others to
assert their interests 22. 
After  presenting  the  fact  that  well-educated  and wealthy  Chinese  people  are  more
likely  to  possess  democratic  values,  Chu  and  Chang  conclude:  “socioeconomic
development  is  positively  correlated  with  demand  for  democratic  principles,
suggesting  that  modernisation  generally  facilitates  the  growth  in  democratic-value
orientation” 23. All these studies suggest that well-educated, urban and wealthy people
have  a  relatively  stronger  orientation  towards  democratic  values  than  the  rest  of
Chinese. 
On the other hand, the multivariable analysis offered by Dowd and his associates finds
the  opposite  direction  between  education  and  political  democracy,  and  between
income and political democracy. Dowd finds no evidence “to suggest that there will be
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increasing pressure for democratisation based on generational replacement effects” 24.
The  positive  relationship  between  age  and  the  probability  of  selecting  political
democracy as the most important value may suggest “there will not be any long-term,
generational-replacement-driven pressure for democratization” 25. 
13 2) This theory emphasises the importance of middle class 26. For Lipset, the middle class
is  the  friend  of  democracy  27.  Moore’s  declaration,  “no  bourgeois,  no  democracy”
touched on the hypothesis about the democratic impulses of middle class 28. Glassman
and  Huntington  both  recognise  that  middle  class  has  particular  affinities  with
democracy 29. 
With  China’s  economic  development,  so  the  country’s  middle  class  has  grown
significantly,  both  in  absolute  number  and  in  percentage  relative  to  the  whole
population. In our study we consider middle class as comprised mainly of managerial
personnel, private entrepreneurs, professionals, civil servants, and getihu30. This social
class owns most of the economic and cultural capital, and limited political capital. We
have chosen occupation as the main criteria to determine position in the social space
because it ties together the three dimensions: political, economic and cultural capital. 
It is difficult to evaluate precisely the degree of support for democratic values among
the  middle  class.  For  Glassman,  China’s  middle  class  should  have  a  high  level  of
democratic values, since there is a global convergence of democratic values among the
middle  classes  across  the  world  31.  Since  middle  class  engenders  a  high  level  of
education and income, we would expect it to hold a higher level of democratic beliefs.
However, such extrapolation is impossible 32. 
14 3)  The  emphasis  in  this  theory  is  on the  importance  of  the  working  class.  Collier,
Rueschemeyer and the Stephens emphasise the importance of the working class in the
process of democratisation instead of political elites 33. They suggest that “the relative
size and the density of organisation of the working class—of employed manual labor
outside of agriculture—are of critical importance for the advance of democracy” 34. It is
the working class that fights for democracy while the bourgeoisie and urban middle
class, that benefited from the status quo, nearly without exception, resist democracy,
once their own interests are secured 35. 
15 With the economic development,  China’s  working class has changed fundamentally.
The  reforming  of  state  and  collective  firms  has  altered  the  pattern  of  “organised
dependence” and the paternalism characteristic of state-labor relations in Mao’s era 36.
In  Mao’s  era,  China’s  working  class  benefited  from the  regime;  by  contrast,  in  the
reform era,  China’s working class is  changing from being beneficiaries to becoming
those  losing  out.  China’s  working  class  has  become  the  subordinate  class  and  its
discontent is rising. Lee’s study records different forms of labour struggles; everyday
workplace  resistance,  petitions,  work  stoppages,  strikes,  public  protest,  violence,
independent unionism. However, even though rising worker discontent is visible, the
likelihood  of  mass  mobilisation  of  workers  against  the  state  appears  low  37.  Lee’s
conclusion is very cautious: on the one hand, a more restive Chinese working class is in
the making, while the emergence of a labour movement against the regime is yet to
come38.
16 Several studies suggest that the Chinese regime has lost the political support of the
working class 39. “China’s political leaders can no longer take comfort in their ability to
turn to the workers for support when facing crisis.  Instead, they must worry about
whether  or  not  they  can  maintain  control  over  their  increasingly  unhappy  and
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fractious proletariat” 40.  The success of China’s economic reforms is paradoxical: the
leaders  intended  to  increase  support  for  the  regime  by  initiating  reform,  but  the
reforms have instead gradually eroded it 41. 
The empirical survey
17 In our study, the support of democratic values is measured by the following two survey
questions that consider: “Having a democratic political system” and “Democracy may have
problems but it’s  better than any other form of government”. Those saying that having a
democratic political system is “very good” or “fairly good” were coded 1, and those
considering it “bad” or “very bad” were coded 0. Those choosing “agree strongly” or
“agree” to respond to the statement that democracy may have problems but it’s better
than any other form of government were coded 1, while those who “disagree strongly”
or “disagree” were coded 0. 
18 Treating “Don’t Know” (DK) answers as “missing” gave a result of a reasonably high
affective  and  evaluative  support  for  democracy.  Of  respondents,  96.3%  supported
“Having a democratic political system” (Table 1), while 89.9% agreed that “Democracy
may have  problems  but  it’s  better  than any  other  form of  government”  (Table  2).
Inglehart  and his  associates,  as  well  as  Dalton and Shin report  this  finding 42.  The
percentage of DK responses for both questions was 23.9% and 34.6% respectively (Table
3 and Table 4). If we treat DK responses as a valid and separate answer, the statistical
result is quite different: 73.3% of respondents supported “Having a democratic political
system” (Table 3) and 58.8% agrees that “Democracy may have problems but it’s better
than any other form of government” (Table 4). These figures reveal a higher level of
democratic orientation than existing literature suggests.
 
1. Affective support of democracy
Frequency of choice of “Having a democratic political system”
 
2. Evaluative support of democracy
Frequency of choice of “Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of
government”
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3. Affective support of democracy
Frequency of choice of “Having a democratic political system”
 
4. Evaluative support of democracy
Frequency of choice of “Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of
government”
19 As we enter the twenty-first century, democracy has become a basic value43. No wonder
then  that  respondents  showed a  high  level  of  affective  and  evaluative  support  for
democracy—Chen  and  Zhong  reported  a  similar  outcome  even  though  their
measurement did not cover support of  norms of democracy 44.  Moreover,  at  a time
when  the  Chinese  government  is  more  ready  to  talk  about  “socialist  democracy”,
“democracy”  has  thus  become  a  legitimate  and  popular  word,  even  though  the
meaning may be differ from that applied to the word and the concept as used in the
Western world. Thus, when Chinese citizens express support for democracy it may be
that support is for a meaning different to that understood by a citizen of an established,
advanced industrial democracy 45.
20 Interpretation  of  DK  responses  is  a  challenge.  In  the  Chinese  context,  DK  can  be
interpreted  in  three  different  ways.  Some  respondents  were  unable  to  answer  the
question  due  to  lack  of  political  knowledge.  Others  have  some  knowledge  about
democracy and its performance, but no clear-cut idea about the meaning of support of
democracy. The third sort of DK is not truly a DK. Under a Communist authoritarian
regime, outright support of democracy is still believed to involve political risk. Thus,
even though supporters of democracy, these respondents would have withheld their
true opinion through caution. 
21 This  survey  does  not  provide  a  measurement  to  identify  these  three  types  of  DK
responses. However, one can assume that 46 the first type of DK is associated with less
income,  education and older age.  As  members of  the working class  tend to  be less
educated  and  less  wealthy,  it  is  assumed  that  most  of  the  responses  given  by  the
respondents  in  this  group  were  of  the  first  type.  The  DK  responses  of  younger,
wealthier and better educated respondent were of the second and third types. While
they have  the  political  knowledge to  decide  their  support  of  democracy,  they may
refuse to answer due to the consideration of potential political risk. They may also feel
somewhat ambivalent, perhaps worrying that the Chinese path to democracy would
engender political instability which could endanger their economic well-being. Thus we
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considered most of the middle class DK responses to belong to the second and third
type of DK.
22 This  study  includes  income,  education  and  age  as  independent  variables.  The
respondents are divided into three age cohorts (18-29 years old, 30-49 years old, and
over 50),  and into three categories of monthly income (less than 500 yuan to 4,000
yuan; 4,001 to 10,000 yuan; 10,001 to more than 100,000 yuan). The education variable is
recoded  into  three  categories:  inadequately  completed  elementary  education  and
completed (compulsory) elementary education; completed secondary school: technical/
vocational and completed secondary school:  university-preparatory; some university
without degree/higher education and university with degree/higher education.
23 Table 5 crosses the results of responses to “Having a democratic political system” with
the independent variables. It suggests the following conclusions. First, age is negatively
associated with acceptance of democratic principles. It does support the generational-
replacement theory. Given that most of the older generation’s DK responses belong to
the first type of response, and part of the younger generation’s DK responses belong to
the third type of response, we are confident in concluding that the Chinese younger
generation  do  have  a  higher  level  of  affective  support  for  democratic  principles.
Second,  the  hypothesis  that  the  Chinese  middle  class  has  elective  affinities  of
democracy is  supported.  Third,  when compared with the middle class,  the working
class  has  a  lower  level  of  affective  support  of  democracy.  Four,  those  with  lower
incomes have a lower level of affective support for democratic principles. Finally, those
with a lower level of education have a lower level of affective support for democratic
principles than those with a higher level of education.
 
5. Affective support of democracy and socio-economic variables
24 Table 6 crosses the responses to “Democracy may have problems but it’s better than
any  other  form  of  government”  with  the  same  variables.  First,  age  is  negatively
associated  with  evaluative  support  of  democratic  principles.  It  does  support  the
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generational-replacement theory. The pretty high percentage of DK responses among
the older generation respondents can be explained by the fact that the evaluation of
democracy  involves  more  political  knowledge  than  an  acceptance  of  democracy.
Second,  there  is  strong  evidence  that  the  Chinese  middle  class  tends  to  evaluate
democracy as the better form of government. Third, the working class has a lower level
of evaluative support of democracy, compared with the middle class. Four, those with
lower incomes offer a lower level of evaluative support for democratic principles, while
those with higher incomes show a higher level of evaluative support for democratic
principles.  Five,  those  less  educated  show  a  lower  level  of  evaluative  support  for
democratic principles than those more highly educated.
 
6. Evaluative support of democracy and socio-economic variables
25 This study finds that the Chinese middle class is positively associated with democratic
values. The Chinese middle class does accept democracy as a desirable political system
and  strongly  evaluates  democracy  as  a  better  form  of  government.  This  finding
confirms the theory on the support of democracy by the middle class as presented by
the literature on democracy and discredits the argument that the Chinese middle class
is anti-democratic or undemocratic by nature 47.  For example, Goodman argues that
“the new middle classes, far from being alienated from the Party-state or seeking their
own  political  voice,  appear  to  be  operating  in  close  proximity  and  through  close
cooperation” 48.  It  is  suggested that  since  the  reforms launched in  1978,  China has
gradually adopted corporatist institutions to influence the development of the middle
class 49.  As a result, the middle class depends heavily on the Party-state and cannot
become a vocal supporter of democracy in the future. This argument is refuted.
26 The  finding  that  age  is  negatively  associated  with  democratic-value  orientation
confirms  the  generation-replacement  theory.  The  generation-replacement  theory
suggests that younger Chinese people are more highly educated and more likely to
accept democratic ideas, thus they are more favourably disposed towards democracy.
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This finding contradicts the argument offered by Friedman and Zhao that the Chinese
younger generation is “nationalists first, democrats second”. According to Friedman
and Zhao, the Chinese government has taken nationalism to block Western influences
and  regain  its  legitimacy  in  the  1990s  50.  Thus,  the  younger  Chinese  generation
educated in the 1990s have been indoctrinated with a strong sentiment of nationalism.
As a result, “many of them would emphasize that ‘they are patriots first and democrats
second.’ Talking about democracy has almost become forbidden among many Chinese
students. It may be considered as unpatriotic, as nationalism has come to be dominant
in the thoughts of Chinese intellectuals” 51. 
27 This study will not go into detail about the subtleties and complications of nationalism.
Drawing upon the  existing empirical  studies  on nationalism 52,  this  study uses  two
questions to measure nationalism: 1)  How proud are you to be Chinese?;  and 2)  Of
course we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that,
would  you  be  willing  to  fight  for  your  country?  53.  The  result  between  age  and
nationalist  sentiment  in  Table  7  suggests  that  there  is  no  significant  generational
difference  in  nationalist  sentiment;  and  that  all  generations  have  a  pretty  high
nationalist sentiment. The co-existence of high democratic orientations and nationalist
sentiments in Chinese younger generations may suggest that the younger generation is
both nationalistic and democratic.
 
7. Age and nationalism
28 People with lower incomes and lower level of education show a lower level of support
for democracy and a high percentage DK response. One explanation could be that such
respondents  usually  lack the political  knowledge and consequentially  are  unable to
form  a  concrete  opinion.  Education  plays  a  critical  role  in  influencing  support  of
democracy.  Highly  educated  Chinese  people  show  the  highest  level  of  support  of
democracy. An explanation could be that education is directly associated with political
knowledge  and  competence.  The  high  percentage  DK  response  to  acceptance  and
evaluation of democracy by those with middle incomes can be explained partly by the
following two points: they either worry about the political risk to themselves or the
risk to their economic well-being.
29 The working class shows a lower level of affective and evaluative support of democracy
compared to the middle class. The high percentage DK response among the working
class can be explained by two points: first, the working class is less wealthy and less
educated and often lacks the political knowledge to enable a definite answer to be given
to both questions; second, the working class needs organisations to empower itself and
shape its democratic values 54. The organisation of the Chinese workers, the All-China
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), far from being an independent organisation, is a
corporatist institution controlled by the Chinese government. The ACFTU, licensed by
the  government  and  under  directives  from  the  Chinese  government  regulates  the
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activities of Chinese workers on behalf of the government 55. As a result, the Chinese
working class lacks the organisations to rouse its interest in democracy. 
Conclusion and implication
30 Some findings of this study may be emphasised. First, the Chinese middle class has the
highest level of support of democracy. However, this does not mean that this social
group will rise against the current regime to fight for democracy. For the middle class
to play a critical role in promoting democracy depends on other factors, such as the
setting-up  of  independent  and  autonomous  civil  organisations  to  co-ordinate  its
collective behaviour. Second, the Chinese working class has exhibited a lower level of
support of democracy compared with the middle class. Even though the working class
has gradually retracted its political support for the regime since 1978, there are no
organisations to rouse its interest in democracy. Third, younger well-educated Chinese
are more ready to accept democratic values and believe that Western democracy is a
better form of governance. This finding confirms the generational-replacement theory.
But  the  younger  generation  is  in  fact  both  nationalistic  and  democratic.  Fourth,
education plays a critical role in the support of democracy. The better educated people
are, the higher the level of support of democracy they exhibit. Overall, this study shows
prospects democracy in China. 
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ABSTRACTS
This study confronts the results of the World Values Survey conducted in China in June 2001 with
three theories on the origins of democratic values. It shows that Chinese people have rather high
democratic  aspirations.  The  Chinese  middle  class  offers  the  highest  level  of  support  for
democracy. The negative relation between age and democratic-value orientations confirms the
generation-replacement  theory.  This  study also  shows that  education plays  a  critical  role  in
support of democracy. 
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